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CASE NOTES
CONDEMNATION-NEWSPAPER PUBLICATION INSUFFICIENT NOTICE UNDER DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE
Plaintiff brought an action to enjoin the city and its agents from entering or trespassing on his property, and for such other and further relief as
the court deemed equitable. The city of Hutchinson, Kansas instituted a
proceeding to condemn part of plaintiff's property under the authority of
the Kansas statute' which required that landowners be given at least ten
days' notice of the time and place of the proceedings. Such notice could
be given either "in writing ... or by one publication in the official city
paper. ....-2Plaintiff here was not given notice in writing but publication

was made in the official city paper of Hutchinson. The court appointed,
pursuant to the statute,3 three commissioners to determine compensation
for the property taken and for any other damage suffered. The commissioner fixed plaintiff's damages at $725. The statute authorized an appeal
from the award of the commissioners if taken within thirty days after the
filing of their report.4 Plaintiff took no appeal within the prescribed
period. Some time later, however, he brought an action in the Kansas
District Court and alleged that he had never been notified of the condemnation proceedings and knew nothing about them until after the time
for appeal had passed. Plaintiff charged that the newspaper publication
authorized by the statute was not sufficient notice to satisfy the due
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution. The District court denied relief and the landowner appealed.
The Supreme Court of Kansas 5 affirmed the judgment and the landowner
appealed. The Supreme Court of the United States held that where the
landowner was a resident of Kansas and his name was on the official
records of the city, newspaper publication alone of notice of condemnation proceedings against his property did not measure up to the quality of notice the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required as a prerequisite to proceedings to fix compensation for condemnation of his property. Walker v. City of Hutcbinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
That due process requires giving a man notice before he can be deprived
1Kan. Stat. Ann. (1949) Art. 2, c. 26.
2Kan. Stat. Ann. (1949) Art. 2, 26 S 202.
8Kan. Stat. Ann. (1949) Art. 2, c. 26 §201.
4Kan. Stat. Ann. (1949) Art. 2, c. 26 §205.
5Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 178 Kan. 263, 284 P. 2d 1073 (1955).
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of his liberty or property is well established.0 In Grannis v. Ordean7 the
Supreme Court of the United States said, "the fundamental requisite of
due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." 8 It was decided long
ago that when property is taken by eminent domain without giving the
owner such notice as would give him an opportunity to be present at the
hearing, the taking is invalid. 9 Such notice must be reasonable and adequate for the purpose. 10
The majority of the court 1 in the instant case cited Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,12 in which the same Kansas statute 13 was involved, wherein the Supreme Court said:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the
Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require

that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded
14 by
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.
Such notices must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."' 15
The question of whether or not a particular type of notice complies with
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been considered
many times by the Supreme Court, and it has repeatedly held that the
adequacy of that notice must be tested as it relates to the particular circumstances.' 6
What is due process in a procedure affecting property interests must be determined by taking into account the purposes of the procedure and its effect
upon the rights asserted and all other circumstances
which may render the
17
proceeding appropriate to the nature of the case.

And in Dobany v. Rogers'8 the court said that the requirements of the
Due Process Clause are satisfied if one has reasonable notice, "due regard
6Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398 (1900); United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513 (1883).
7234 U.S. 385 (1914).
8 Ibid., at 394.
OTurpin v. Lemon, 187 U.S. 51 (1902); United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883).
10
Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900).
11 Mr. Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented; Mr. Justice Brennan
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
J2 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
1s Kan. Stat. Ann. (1949) Art. 2,c. 26.
14 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
15 Ibid., at 314.
16 City of New York v. New York, N. H., & H. R. Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953); Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Risty, 276 U.S. 567 (1928); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S.
385 (1914); Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261 (1912).
17 Anderson Nat'l. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944).
18 281 U.S. 362 (1930).
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being had to the nature of the proceeding and the character of the rights
which may be affected by it."' 19
In the instant case, the state relied, in asserting that the taking in ques-

tion was valid, on North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman20 and Huling v.
Kaw Valley Ry. & Improvement Co.21 In these two cases similar notice
requirements were upheld as being adequate under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Justice Black, delivering the opinion of the court in the instant
case, pointed out that such reliance was misplaced. In the Huling case,
notice by publication in a condemnation proceeding was upheld on the
ground that the landowner was a non-resident, in the North Laramie
2
case,22 the United States Supreme Court upheld the Wyoming statute 3
which provided for notice by publication in a newspaper and required
that a copy of the newspaper must be sent to the landowner by registered
mail.
In holding the notice inadequate, the court in the instant case said:
It is common knowledge that mere newspaper
publication rarely informs a
24
landowner of proceedings against his property.
And in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,25 the court said:
Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes
his home outside the area of the newspaper's normal circulation
the odds that
26
the information will never reach him are large indeed.
As a background for these words is a statement by the court in the wellknown case of McDonald v. Mabee.2 1 "[G]reat caution should be used
not to let fiction deny the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty
close adhesion to fact." 2s In referring to the adequacy of substituted service, the Supreme Court has said it must be "reasonably calculated to give
[the defendant] actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to
'29
be heard.
An examination of recent prior Supreme Court decisions on the adequacy of notice by publication as to a resident might have enabled one to
reasonably predict the decision in the instant case. In City of New York
19 Ibid., at 369.
21 130 U.S. 559 (1889).
22 Ibid.

20 268 U.S. 276 (1925).

23

Wyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) c. 3 S 1101.
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956).
25 339 U.S. 306 (1950).

24

26 Ibid., at 315.
27 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
28 Ibid., at 91.
29 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

v. New York, N.H., &2H.R. Co.,30 the court said: "Notice by publication
is a poor and sometimes a hopeless substitute for actual service of notice.
Its justification is difficult at best. .... ,,31
"When notice is a person's due,
32
process which is a mere gesture is not due process."
In holding that the notice by publication fell short of the requirements
of due process, the court in the instant case stated that there seemed to be
no compelling or even persuasive reasons why personal notice could not
have been given. Plaintiff's name was known to the city and was on the
official records. A letter would have apprised him of the proceedings. 3
Finally, the court said: "In too many instances notice by publication is
not notice at all. It may leave government authorities free to fix one-sidedly the amount that must be paid owners for their property taken for
'34
public use."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented for the reason that the only constitutional question raised by plaintiff was whether failure to give adequate
notice of the hearing of itself invalidates the taking, apart from any claim
of loss. The state may take land prior to payment without violating the
Due Process Clause, so long as adequate provision for payment of compensation is made. 35 The compensation was not alleged to be inadequate.
Mr. Justice Burton dissented on the grounds that the statutory provision
for a ten-day notice by publication is within the constitutional discretion
of the State legislature; that just compensation is constitutionally necessary, but the length and kind of notice of proceeding to determine such
compensation is a matter of legislative discretion. He cited Collins v. City
of Wichita,36 which upheld the same ten-day notice, wherein the court
stated:
While there is some authority to the contrary, the great weight of authority
supports the proposition that a condemnation proceeding is... in rem and that
constructive notice meets the requirement of due process3 7
An examination of the Collins case reveals that the opinion cites Walker
v. City of Hutchinson as a case where the ten-day notice was upheld.
344 U.S. 293 (1953).
Ibid., at 296.
32 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
33 Section 202, Article 2, Chapter 26 was amended in 1955, after the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Mullane case, to require that the city must
give notice to property owners by mailing a copy of the newspaper notice to their last
30

31

known address, unless such residence could not be located by diligent inquiry. Kan.
Stat. Ann. (1949) (Supp., 1955) Art. 2, c. 26 S 202.
3
4 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 117 (1956).
35 Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919); North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268
U.S. 276 (1925).
36225 F. 2d 132 (C.A. 10th, 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 886 (1955).
37 Ibid., at 135.
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This latter decision is the one which the majority of the court in the
instant case reversed and remanded.
The Illinois statutes provide for notice to a resident by publication only
where the defendant has gone out of the state, or on due inquiry cannot
38
be found, or is concealed within the state, so that he cannot be served.
Thus it can be seen that the notice requirement in Illinois complies with
the Due Process Clause as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the instant
case.
38111. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 47, S§ 4, 5, c. 110 §§ 14, 15.

CONTRACTS-FRUSTRATION INAPPLICABLE TO
RESTRICTIVE ZONING LAWS EXISTING
WHEN PREMISES LEASED
Plaintiff obtained a judgment by confession for rent pursuant to an
executed lease. Defendant sought to vacate the judgment on the grounds
that when the lease was executed, both the plaintiff and the defendant
contemplated that the premises would be used for the manufacturing of
automotive parts; and that after the execution of the lease and occupation
of the premises by the defendant, the defendant was notified by a city
building inspector that the use being made of the premises violated an
existing zoning ordinance; and that the foregoing facts constituted impossibility of performance on the part of the defendant. The court held that
the primary promise of a lessee is to pay rent and there is nothing legally
impossible about paying such rent; therefore, the doctrine of commercial
frustration was not applicable because the zoning ordinance was in existence at the time of the making of the lease. Warshawsky v. American
Automotive Products, 12 Ill. App. 2d 178, 138 N. E. 2d 816 (1956).
Although the doctrine of frustration has been mentioned in cases
throughout the United States, there is not, as can best be determined, a
court of last resort which has expressly applied it or Section 288 of the
Restatement of Contracts' in determining the final outcome of a contracts
case.2 Here, an intermediate court in Illinois, in a rare instance, mentions
the doctrine but does not apply it, pursuant to the vast majority of decisions of courts throughout the United States.
I Where the assumed possibility of a desired object or effect to be attained by either
party to a contract forms the basis on which both parties enter into it, and this object
or effect is or surely will be frustrated, a promisor who is without fault in causing the
frustration, and who is harmed thereby, is discharged from the duty of performing his
promise unless a contrary intention appears. Rest., Contracts § 288 (1932).
2 Osius v. Barton, 109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933), was a case where the court based
its authority on S 288 of the Restatement of Contracts but actually used real property
and equity principles without mentioning the doctrine of frustration.

